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ransnational, violent non-state actors operate in weak states for a number
of reasons. The most prevalent of these
is the host state’s inability to sustain the
basic requirement of statehood: a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical
force. When the monopoly of force is
lost, violent groups establish reciprocal
relationships with the relevant marginalized populations, allowing these
actors to not only exist in weak states,
but to thrive. Disenfranchised ethnic
and political groups provide either tacit

or active support and render transnational, violent non-state actors able to
establish illicit economies in order to
fund their activities.
One violent non-state actor in particular, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), found success in the 1990s
launching cross-border attacks into
Turkey from neighboring Iraq. Clearly Iraq’s loss of control over its sovereign territories made this possible, but
to blame weak borders oversimplifies

the politics; more moving parts were
involved. Three successive factors allowed the PKK to operate from Iraq:
the state’s loss of monopoly on legitimate violence, the presence of marginalized populations, and access to illicit
economies. The academic theories of
political scientists Boaz Atzili, Michael
Klare, and Daniel Posner demonstrate
that these factors contribute to the efficacy of violent non-state actors residing
in weak states in a broader sense.

fied, but they also had few opportunities
to be incorporated into Lebanese society.
They were true outsiders and therefore easily rallied to support the PLO with whom
they identified more readily than their host
state. The PLO’s ability to act as a surrogate
state in the absence of Lebanese state services solidified the relationship between
two groups whose identities and ideologies
had already aligned.
At times, the alignment of marginalized
groups with non-state actors is accelerated

by the politics of the state. For example,
politics in Malawi have historically divided
along ethnic lines, much like in Lebanon.
Daniel Posner describes the historical circumstances in which this climate developed as a result of antagonism between
Malawi’s major ethnic groups, Chewas and
Tumbukas. Malawi has a history of political mobilization of ethnic groups, a practice that tends to marginalize particular
populations relative to those in favor; the
Tumbukas were intentionally marginalized
under Chewa president Hastings Kamuzu

Banda. Although there is no evidence of
the co-optation of the marginalized groups
by transnational, violent non-state actors,
one can imagine that, were a Tumbuka-based insurgency to seek refuge from
the Zambian state, they would find their
presence welcomed among marginalized
Tumbukas in Malawi.
In fragile states we find an almost formulaic pattern by which marginalized populations are forced to ally with transnational,
violent non-state actors when the formal
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Monopoly on the Use of Legitimate Force
For a transnational violent non-state actor to move
into a third party host state, that state must be weak
in the most basic sense; it must be unable to maintain a monopoly on the use of force throughout its
sovereign territories. This loss of sovereignty over
territories distant from the capital, weak regulation
of borders, and incapacity to maintain rule of law
allows stateless groups to move into the country.
These circumstances are necessary but not sufficient for the proliferation of these groups, or for
the success of their operations. It is simply the first
of several conditions that create an ideal refuge for
terrorist or guerrilla groups.
Boaz Atzili considers the lack of a monopoly of
force a prerequisite of residence in a third-party
host state as well, but looks deeper into the ways
these actors take advantage of the lack of control
the state has over its land and people. He posits
that the conventional wisdom on the vacuum of
power in weak states is “grossly underspecified.”
In order to supplement this dearth of understanding, he explores several more specific facets of
state weakness and their implications in regards to
transnational, violent non-state actors. This article, on the other hand, argues that state weakness
opens the door for violent non-state actors, but
does not independently provide an environment in
which these actors can flourish or even carry out
their basic functions absent the marginalized populations necessary for support and, subsequently,
access to illicit economies.
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In the case of the PKK, Iraq’s state weakness is not
the sine qua non to the organization’s success. State
weakness is, however, a precursor to the PKK’s decision to utilize Iraqi territory in order to launch
cross-border attacks into Turkey. While Northern
Iraq is one of the few regions of the country with
little violence, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), not the central government, holds
a monopoly on force there. Had the Republic of
Iraq continuously controlled their northern territories, the PKK would not have had the option
to rally in the Zagros Mountains. Nevertheless, in
their search for a refuge from Turkish forces, PKK
leadership did not relocate their forces into neighboring Armenia, Syria, or even Georgia, despite
those states’ fragility. Clearly state weakness and
the state’s lack of a monopoly on force is only one
of the factors that influenced their decision to go
to Iraq.

Marginalized Populations
Beyond the basic capacity of a transnational violent non-state actor to penetrate a state’s territory
and seek sanctuary there, a second element is essential to a violent group’s success: the presence
of a relevant marginalized population that is readily co-opted into the violent actor’s cause. Atzili
cites the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as the
marginalized population essential to the operations of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO); the parallels between the PLO and the PKK
are undeniable in this respect. Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon were not only displaced and dissatis-
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government is unable to offer them
protection. In states where the central
government lacks a monopoly on the
use of force, fringe groups have few
choices; they must either flee or seek
protection from a secondary source.
This is especially true for marginalized groups who are excluded from
state patronage networks. They must
consequently build relationships with
non-state actors and, as a result, are
able to maintain some normalcy and
a measure of control. This type of
alignment happens in Pakistan, where
the residents of ungoverned tribal areas seek protection from the Pakistani
Taliban, and in Colombia, where isolated rural populations are protected
by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC).

Kurdish Man | Photo by: Murat Yazar
The PKK did, of course, find marginalized populations in Iraq, specifically
the populations of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Their affiliation, however, was never
as straightforward as the PLO’s relationship with Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon. While the Kurds of Northern Iraq certainly were marginalized
within their state and identified more
with Greater Kurdistan than with the
Republic of Iraq, they never depended
on the PKK for the provision of services or even protection from the state.
Prior to the incursion of the PKK, the
KRG was already home to political
competition between rival Kurdish
political parties (both of whom were
willing and able to provide services

23 | Ex-Patt Magazine of Foreign Affairs

where the state was lacking) and had
its own Kurdish paramilitary units.
What they were able to lend to the
PKK was sympathy and, to an extent,
legitimacy. As a consequence of the
KRG’s autonomy, Iraqi Kurdistan’s
support for the PKK fluctuated over
time. Complicating this matter was
the KRG’s dependence on Turkey for
economic and political support. As a
result, the KRG at times supported the
PKK, even providing fertile ground
for recruitment, and at times actively
fought to expel them from Iraq.

Illicit Economies
Much of what can be gained from the
support of local marginalized populations comes in the form of access to illicit economies. Indeed, transnational
violent non-state actors need recruitment and political support, but they
also need funding and weapons.
Michael Klare is an expert on illicit
economies’ funding for transnational
violent non-state actors. In the book
When States Fail, he describes the system through which illicit commodities flow out of weak states and small
arms flow in. He claims that paramilitary groups form on the basis of ethnic-political factions or are co-opted
by marginalized groups once the monopoly on the use of legitimate force
is lost. The resident populations then
aid the paramilitary groups in accessing illicit economic networks. These
economies can be based on drugs,
diamonds or human trafficking, but
they must exist under the radar of the
central government, an easier task in
weak states than in strong ones. According to Klare, the system of exchange of illicit goods for light weapons is dependent on state weakness
and an environment of lawlessness
in order to take advantage of and, in
some instances, create the networks of
illicit trade.
In many cases, marginalized popu-

lations removed from the patronage
networks have already established
illicit economies by the time foreign
terrorist or guerrilla groups move in.
Because weak states are often rife with
corruption, those who fall outside the
groups receiving preferential treatment and the majority of the state’s
resources may be forced to operate
in the trade of illicit goods, or at the
very least in semi-formal economies
outside the sphere of state influence.
Transnational, violent non-state actors simply use the populace they have
co-opted into their cause as an entry
point to these economies.

basic attributes of a weak state that
invite terrorist and guerilla groups in.
More important to the success of these
groups is the presence of relevant marginalized populations and the ability of
those populations to provide the nonstate actor access to illicit economies.
These economies can be either pre-existing as a result of state weakness or
established by the violent non-state

actor as a funding mechanism with the
tacit or active assistance of the marginalized population.
The case study of the PKK and its incursion into Iraq supports this model, albeit not as forthrightly as Atzili’s
example of the PLO in Lebanon. The
complex web of interactions between
Iraq, Turkey, the PKK, the KRG and

even political parties within the KRG
make controlling for outside influence
challenging and comparisons difficult to draw. What is clear, however,
is that the PKK’s presence in Iraq is
based upon more than the weakness of
the Iraqi state; it is dependent on the
sympathy and support of marginalized
Iraqi Kurds and the help they can offer
in utilizing illicit economies.

Still other groups bring illicit economies with them when they move in
and exploit friendly, local populations
for logistical assistance. This is the
case with the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. The group claims to acquire only
weapons and funding from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, but it is widely
believed that there is an illicit element
to the flow of resources from Europe
to Kurdistan. The PKK was reported
to facilitate 60-80% of the European
drug trade in the mid-1990s, overseeing the drug traffic between Central
Asia and Western Europe. Although
this is not an endeavor the populations of Iraqi Kurdistan had previously undertaken, it is unlikely that
such massive smuggling networks
could be managed without their support if drugs and weapons do indeed
move through the Zagros Mountains.
Whether this support is an active
economic exchange or merely willful
ignorance of the PKK’s activities is a
matter of debate.

Multiple Causes
State weakness, specifically the lack
of a monopoly of the legitimate use
of force, is not enough to support
transnational, violent non-state actors in search of sanctuary. The loss
of control over territories and other
aspects of statehood are only the most
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